56
-6-
anywhere (per Cockburn C.J. in Reg. v. Keyn at pp. 163, 168-9:
Hawkin's Pleas of the Crown, Volume 1 Chapter 20 Section 1;
Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 9 p. 524: Archbold's
Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 28th Edition,
pp. 670-1: Hall's International Law, 8th Edition, pp. 311,
317). That view was held by the Privy Council in A.G.
for Hong Kong v. Kwok a Sing (1873 L.R. 5 P.C. 179 at 199,
200), and the jurisdiction specifically recognised in
the Courts of that Colony. In this respect we think the
acting Chief Justice was wrong when he expressed the
opinion that such jurisdiction in order to exist would
probably require to be founded on an express Statute of
the Imperial Parliament. But even so, it seems to us
that the Admiralty Offences (Colonial) Act 1849 (12 & 13
Vict. C. 96) coupled if necessary with the earlier Acts
11 William III C. 7 and 46 Geo. III C. 54 have effect-
ively invested the Hong Kong Courts with jurisdiction to
try foreigners charged with piracy 'jure gentium' upon
the high seas. But such jurisdiction is confined to
acts falling within the conception of piracy 'jure gentium'
under international law. Any extension and conversely
any restriction in the definition of that crime in
English municipal law has not affected that jurisdiction.
Thus it remains to examine whether actual
robbery is a necessary ingredient in the commission of
piracy jure gentium' or whether an unsuccessful attempt
to rob upon the high seas fulfills that crime. Up to
the present case, this question seems to have been treated
academically, for no direct answer has been given judicially,
facts apparently not having arisen to require it.
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